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Abstract 
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most dictators 
throughout history. Better informed viziers are also better able to discriminate among 
potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the dictator. To avoid 
this, dictators, especially which are weak and vulnerable, sacri.ce the competence of their 
agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. One reason why democracies generally 
witness more talented people in the government is the dictator.s inability to commit to the 
optimal (less than the capital) punishment for those who unsuccessfully plotted to remove 
him from power. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a dictator is limited by 
the fact that rewards are conditional on dictator.s own willingness to keep his promises, 
while punishments are conditional on dictator.s own survival. We model a principal-
agent game between a dictator and his (probably, few) viziers both in static and dynamic 
perspectives. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem the 
insecure dictators face. 
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 1 Introduction
Dictatorship is one of the oldest forms of government. Human history is replete with ex-
amples of unconstrained rulers, most exhibiting poor governance. Despite the enormous
successes of democracies on every count, there is no sure sign that dictatorship is vanishing
as a form of governance today. While the number of democratic countries increased sig-
ni￿cantly during the last decades of the 20th century, there is also a signi￿cant number of
emerging dictatorships, especially in countries of the former Soviet Union. If in countries
like Cuba, Burma, Egypt, Libya, North Korea, Zimbabwe the regimes have already reached
some sort of maturity, the situation is very di⁄erent in the newly emerging dictatorships in
the countries of the former Soviet Union such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, or Belorussia.
In this paper, we do not study why dictatorships emerge.1 Instead, we focus on the in-
ternal structure of dictatorships. When a dictator faces threats from both inside and outside
his country, one limit on his power is the incompetence of his ministers and advisors. While
incompetent ministers are not completely unusual in democratic countries, most historians
and political scientists would agree that dictatorships are especially marred by incompe-
tence. Most recently, Saddam Hussein￿ s failure to maintain a reasonable pre-war strategy
and defense (even taking into account overwhelming American military power) seems in par-
ticular to be due to the incompetence of his closest advisors. The infamous Iraqi information
minister Muhammed al-Sahhad (dubbed ￿ Comical Ali￿ ) is only one manifestation of this pat-
tern. Furthermore, even the best of dictators have lost the most competent of their advisors
while acquiring more and more power. Napoleon￿ s Marshal Jean-Batist Bernadotte ￿in
Napoleon￿ s opinion, one of the two marshals with a war talent equal to that of the Emperor
himself ￿left Napoleon not out of fear of ultimate defeat, but at the zenith of Napoleon￿ s
power in 1811. In his most unfortunate military undertaking, the 1812 Russian campaign,
Napoleon was surrounded by his most loyal marshals, rather than his most competent ones.
1For an excellent overview of the state of the arts in the dictatorship literature see Wintrobe (1998) and
Bueno de Mesquita et al (2004). Watchekon (2000) argues that dictatorships are more likely to emerge in
countries which are rich in natural resources. Acemoglu (2003) and Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004)
suggest a dynamic framework for studying modern disctatorships. Dom￿nguez (2002) lists traits that are
likely to be exposed by a politically e⁄ective military dictatorships.
2Stalin, a dictator of a very di⁄erent kind, was notable for having exclusively mediocrities in
his inner circle (Gregory, 2004).
Yet the main problem for a dictator might be not the incompetence, but a possible
treachery of a vizier. As early as in 1965 BCE, i.e. almost four thousand years ago, King
Sesostris of Egypt warned future kings in his Instruction: ￿ Be on your guard against all sub-
ordinates, because you cannot be sure who is plotting against you￿(Rindova and Starbuck,
1997). Han Fei Tzu, a Chinese philosopher of the 3th century BCE, advised rulers to distrust
subordinates and inspire fear in them. Wintrobe (2000) notes that ￿ the dictator has every
reason to suspect that there are plots against him￿and lists some dictators that have been
consumed by paranoia, ￿ the most likely personality characteristics possessed by dictators￿ :
the Roman Emperors, Nero and Tiberius, and modern dictators Stalin and Mao Zedong.
Often, dictators￿long tenures witness executions or at least long imprisonments of their
closest subordinates. For example, the history of European monarchies contains a long list
of brilliant ￿rst ministers executed (for various formal reasons) by their sovereigns: Thomas
More by Henry VII of England, Angerran de Maringhi by Philippe IV of France, Thomas
Wentworth (Stra⁄ord) by Charles I of England, etc. Modern examples include executions
and imprisonment of close associates of Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and Saddam Hussein,
not to mention the ￿ great purges￿of the Stalin era.
The principal-agent theory, coupled with an appropriate selection model, helps us to
explain simultaneously the incompetence and the treason phenomenon.2 One driving force is
that a more competent advisor is more prone to treason: he might be more easily bribed into
a plot, etc. The reason is that a cunning ￿rst minister acts as a discriminating monopolist
(for possible enemies of the crown), while an uninformed ￿rst minister acts as a normal
monopolist. As Bueno de Mesquita et al (2004) put it, ￿ The incentive to defect from the
incumbent to a challenger depends on the prospects of being included into the challenger￿ s
winning coalition if he should replace the incumbent￿ . Assuming that the willingness of the
￿rst minister to accept a bribe is increasing both in the size of the bribe and the probability
2Proper acknowledgement of the principal-agent theory insights that in￿ uenced this work would have
amounted to a small survey, which is hardly appropriate here. Still, it would certainly include the works of
Myerson, Milgrom, Maskin, Tirole, and Holmstrom on theoretical issues; Aghion, Bolton, and Oliver Hart
on contracts; Coase and Oliver Williamson on transaction costs; Shleifer on corporate governance.
3of success of the plot (or a foreign invasion), the dictator trades o⁄ the loyalty of his ￿rst
minister (less willingness to accept a bribe) and his competence (higher willingness to accept
bribes for treason). Napoleon once explained that it is this trade-o⁄ that made him willing
to keep both Talleyrand (a cunning foreign minister) and Savari (a loyal, but less cunning
interior minister).
Though de￿nitely adhering to the main paradigm of the principal-agent theory, we de-
liberately abstain from using some standard contract theory approaches to principal-agent
issues. The main di⁄erences between this model and a standard one are that the dicta-
tor has a very limited power on determining the payo⁄s for the agent, both for the case
where the agent is to be rewarded and where he is to be punished; and all information is ex
post observable by the dictator. Indeed, it might be taken as a de￿nition of a dictatorship
that, once all the power is allocated to a single authority, all promises are subject to future
reevaluation by this authority.3
With a dictator understanding that a better informed advisor is more likely to misinform
him, the incentive for a competent politician to accept a high position in a dictatorial regime
diminishes. In this case it is the threat of execution for treason or another severe punishment
that might deter the most competent people from pursuing their careers. If the dictator is
able to commit to some mild level of punishment (in the presence of the information-vs.-
bribe trade-o⁄ that the advisor faces, capital punishment should be always suboptimal),
then this problem can be resolved. However, in the subgame where the dictator believes
that the advisor is a traitor, he has no incentive not to apply capital punishment. This is
one place where democracy has an advantage over dictatorship: a commitment problem of
this kind might be easier to resolve with democratic institutions in place. The dictator￿ s
inability to commit to the optimal level of punishment is a particular case of a more general
phenomenon: any use of incentives schemes by a dictator is limited by the fact that rewards
and punishments are necessarily conditional upon dictator￿ s own survival. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001, and other works), building on the pioneering insights of North and Weingast
3Many modern dictatorships, have been democracies by constitution and held regular, if non-competitive,
elections (e.g., the Philippines under Marcos, Paraguay under Stressner, and almost all socialist states). So,
delineation of democracies and dictatorships, though often obvious, is to a large extent a matter of judgement
on the researcher￿ s part.
4(1989), emphasize the role of democratization and delegation of authority as commitment
devices.4
An important class of situations in which the choice of a close associate is very important
to a dictator is when the dictator faces the succession problem. Historically, dictators with
a plebeian origin were very rarely able to create a dynasty of their own.5 Herz (1952) argues
that of the dictators of the ￿rst half of the 20th century, only few succeeded in controlling
their succession, one such example being the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk￿ s transfer of
power to the designated successor.6 Securing succession of their choice, dictators face the
same problem that they face while selecting a vizier. The more capable a potential successor
is, the more he is able to overthrow the dictator. This might be the reason that many
undisputed leaders have been mute on potential succession. To study problems of succession,
we investigate our formal model in a dynamic perspective, where the current choice of the
dictator is a⁄ected not only by his own survival prospects, but by those of his successors as
well.
When considering dictatorships, the role of case studies of particular regimes cannot
be exaggerated. An excellent study of the structure of Stalin￿ s regime was carried out by
Gregory (2003). This study is particularly valuable because it used archives that became
available only recently, including protocols of the Politburo meetings. A number of studies on
particular regimes were carried out by Lewis. Considering the rule of Salazar, the Portugal
dictator in 1932￿ 1968, Lewis (1978) identi￿es the self-selection of subordinates problem:
￿ [Salazar] was... intolerant of those who did not share [his own views] to the last degree. That
discouraged many talented young men from entering the government service.￿With Salazar￿ s
power being increasingly secure, ￿ the patterns of recruitment show the regime evolving from
its military and semi-fascist beginnings in the direction of a modern technocratic state￿
4North and Weingast (1989) (see also, Shepsle, 1991) made the commitment issue central in political
science, demonstrating, in particular, that the interest rate for a constitutionally restrained monarch (William
III) might be lower than for a powerful one (Sturts from James I to James II). The same historical context
seems to support our message as well: a constrained ruler is more likely to have better ministers.
5Well-known examples include Oliver Cromwell and Napoleon.
6Twenty years after the Herz￿ s article was completed, the last of the European dictators that came into
power in 1930s, general Franco of Spain, succesfully transferred power to a designated successor.
5(Lewis, 1978). In a search for a ￿ perfect dictatorship￿ , Dom￿nguez (2002) studies the most
successful dictatorships of the 20th century: Mexico, Brazil, Chile and South Korea. He
argues that all of them employed talented people, at least at the early years of the regime.
However, with regimes maturing, personalist and institutionalized dictatorships diverged
with respect to the political competence. In a personalist dictatorship such as South Korea
under Park Chung Hee rule, competent people have been driven out of the government with
the establishment of the loyalty-based Yushin system in 1971. Brazil and Mexico, with their
institutionalized succession within an authoritarian regime, have had signi￿cantly less of
these problems.
Probably, the most prominent modern theory highlighting advantages of dictatorship is
Mancur Olson￿ s ￿ stationary bandit￿paradigm (Olson, 1993).7 However, as Wintrobe (2000)
rightly observes, ￿ the problem with Olson￿ s analysis is that, comparing dictatorships, the
worst regimes in human history appear to be precisely those such as Nazi Germany, Soviet
Russia, or Cambodia which appear to have been the most encompassing.￿ The agency
theory of dictatorships suggests an explanation why, despite a large encompassing interest,
even a benevolent dictator may fail to implement a socially desirable policy. The ￿ loyalty
vs. competence￿trade-o⁄, which is much more severe when commitment mechanisms are
weak, is in a sense an indispensable feature of any dictatorship. Even if a dictator reads
this paper, and understands the logic, it gives no help to him if he is insistent on keeping
his power unrestricted. Until he opts for a sustainable delegation of power to other political
institutions, he will have no opportunity to improve the quality of ministers.
Wintrobe (1990) classi￿es dictatorial regimes basing on the goal dictators pursue. How-
ever, while investigating the internal structure of dictatorial regimes, this study describes
only general trends and relationships between di⁄erent groups in the society. Wantchekon
(2002) investigates the rise of democratic and dictatorial institutions out of anarchy. He
argues that ￿ democratization is less likely when the factions depend heavily on foreign aid
or natural resource wealth,￿again raising the question of connection between factor endow-
7The idea of a stationary bandit can of course be traced back to Hobbes, who appraised monarchy as
a system where public a⁄airs are run perfectly because they are actually private. A formal model can be
found, e.g., in McGuire and Olson (1996).
6ments and institutions. De Long and Shleifer (1993) ￿nd that ￿ a region ruled by an absolutist
prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century
relative to a region without absolutist government.￿ Providing solid micro foundations for
this general picture is one of the tasks our model seeks to accomplish.
The agency theory of dictatorships need not be applied exclusively to the problem of
hiring a prime minister.8 The main trade-o⁄ that we investigate might not be entirely new
in the corporate governance literature, where the principal-agent con￿ ict was studied in
the ￿rst place. The commitment problem innate to dictatorships is not so extreme in the
corporate world; there are contracts and courts that enforce them. Still, a top-manager of
￿rm, which is concerned with the possibility of ￿ betrayal￿by a hired agent, might be willing
to hire a mediocrity rather than a high-ability or a low-ability agent. It is of course never the
question of life and death, and calling ￿ betrayal￿actions that make your supervisor feeling
less happier is a bit of exaggeration, but still a subordinate who possesses superior ability
to foresee business development might be a danger for anyone who hires her. Friebel and
Raith (2004) (see also Prendergast and Topel, 1996) explore the way this danger a⁄ects
the hierarchical structure of a ￿rm. Glazer (2001) demonstrates that when an agent with
a high ability to run a ￿rm also possesses superior skills in internal rent-seeking, the owner
might be willing to hire a low-ability one. In contrast, this model highlights that it might
not be that the same person has two complimentary qualities, but the very quality for
which the agent is hired (competence) might be the source of potential disutility to his
principal. Prendergast (1993) (see also Morris, 2003) demonstrates that if subordinate￿ s
activity is rewarded basing on subjective performance evaluation, high-powered incentives,
while inducing the subordinate to work harder, make him conform to the opinion of his
principals. Though some of the features are similar to that of our model (e.g. that relevant
information possessed by the agent is lost for the principal in equilibrium), the approaches
are very di⁄erent. First, we do not make use of subjective performance evaluation: if the
plot fails, the dictator gets all the relevant information. Second, the vizier has no need to
8For the same reason, many of ancient and medieval rulers hired foreign bodyguards, who were less able
to take power themselves than the local military. In his The Twelve Caesars, Suetonius (this edition, 1979)
mentions foreign body-guards protecting Caligula, the foremost example of an unconstrained ruler fearing
betrayal.
7conform to the dictator￿ s opinion, which he knows for sure. Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer
(2003) investigate the trade-o⁄ between competence of a hired manager and the loyalty of
a family member, generally lacking that competence. In our model, loyalty and competence
are two sides of the same token.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal analysis.
Section 3 derives and discusses implication of the formal model, while Section 4 is focused
on the dynamic perspective. Section 5 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Formal Theory
2.1 The Setup
There are two players in the basic model, a dictator and an agent.9 The dictator faces a
threat of a plot and has to decide whether to take costly precautionary measures. If the
dictator does not undertake extra measures, the plot succeeds if the enemy is strong (enemy￿ s
type is t = Strong), and fails if the enemy is weak (t = Weak). Ex ante, the probability
that the enemy is strong is P(t = Strong) = q. If the dictator survives, he gets the utility of
Y . If extra measures, which cost C, 0 < C < Y , to the dictator, are undertaken, the enemy
has no chance to take over. The dictator is unable to judge the seriousness of the plot, so
he hires an agent which is more able to deal with the problem. However, the agent himself
is imperfectly informed. Let agent￿ s signal about the enemy￿ s type be denoted by s. Agents
of type ￿ are characterized by
P(s = Weak j t = Weak) = ￿,
while P(s = Strong j t = Strong) = 1: Parameter ￿ re￿ ects the degree of competence of
the agent. Thus, the dictator hires a person of type ￿ and assigns him a policy to act upon.
9Our basic setup allows to capture not only single agent acting as a ￿rst minister, but also collective
advisory bodies. Evidently, in this case the values of parameters may be di⁄erent, and one may think that
the main e⁄ect is that probabilities of mistakes are less. However, collective bodies are subject to correlated
signals and information cascades, which makes the increase in e¢ ciency much less signi￿cant. We consider
the case of two agents explicitly further in the paper.
8This policy ￿D is a mapping from the set of possible signals, fStrong;Weakg; to the set of
actions, fH;Lg, where H and L stand for high and low level of agent￿ s e⁄orts, respectively.
An agent hired by the dictator might behave opportunistically, i.e. betray the dictator.
We view betrayal as an action such that a 6= ￿D (s). In the case of betrayal, the vizier
expects to receive a reward of R + R if the plot is successful. We assume that R is ￿xed
and parametrizes enemy￿ s strength and, perhaps more importantly, the ability to commit
to pay the reward after the plot, while R is stochastic from the dictator￿ s viewpoint and is
distributed on (0,1) with c.d.f. G(x) and p.d.f. g (x) such that g0(x) < 0.
If the agent had betrayed, but the plot did not succeed, the information about the plot
is revealed to the dictator who punishes the agent with a disutility of F. There is also a
premium received by the agent in the case the dictator survives the plot and learns that
the agent did not betray him. (We assume that W > R:) Formally, the agent decides on
a 2 fH;Lg, i.e. the level of defense e⁄orts (high or low), conditional on the dictator￿ s order,
so he chooses a strategy from the set of all mappings f(￿D;s;R)g ￿! fH;Lg:The timing of
the one-shot game is as follows.
Timing
1. Dictator chooses an agent characterized by ￿ from the pool of candidates with compe-
tence that ranges from 0 to 1 and prescribes a policy ￿D to him.
2. The agent gets a noisy signal about the enemy￿ s strength and learns R, the stochastic
component of his pay-o⁄if the plot is successful. Basing on this information, the agent
chooses the level of e⁄orts a 2 fH;Lg. E⁄ectively, the agent decides whether or not
to betray the dictator.
3. The plot unfolds, and the outcome is determined. The dictator gets his pay-o⁄. The
agent is rewarded or punished.
We are focusing our analysis on the sub-game perfect equilibria of the above game. (In
the dynamic game analyzed in Section 4, the relevant concept is the Markov perfect equi-
librium.) For simplicity, we always assume that if the agent is indi⁄erent between betrayal
and remaining loyal, he remains loyal.
92.2 Agent￿ s Behavior
To solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction, i.e. by
studying the behavior of an agent of a ￿xed type ￿ who has received policy prescription ￿D
and information about the potential reward guaranteed by the dictator￿ s enemies, R + R.
Proposition 1 (i) If s = Weak, the agent will not betray the dictator. If s = Strong and
￿D (Strong) = L, the agent will not betray either. The only case where the agent opts to
betray is s = Strong, ￿D (Strong) = H and
￿
R + R
￿
P(t = Strong j s = Strong) ￿ FP(t = Weak j s = Strong) > W: (1)
(ii) The probability that the agent of a ￿xed type ￿, having received a strong signal, obeys
the orders of the dictator, increases with the reward W; the level of punishment for treason
F; and decreases with the ex-ante probability of a serious plot, q; and his a¢ nity with the
opposition, R: Moreover, the same probability of betrayal of a more competent agent can be
achieved only by a higher level of reward/punishment.
The straightforward intuition behind condition (1) is that the agent betrays as long as he
knows that his expected utility from betrayal exceeds that in the case of no betrayal. Both
probabilities are conditional on the agent￿ s signal s and thus are functions of the agent￿ s
competence ￿. To calculate them, the agent uses the Bayes formula:
P(t = Strong j s = Strong) =
q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
.
If s = Strong and ￿D (Strong) = H, then the probability that the agent of type ￿ does not
betray (from the standpoint of an outside observer, e.g. the dictator) is
G
￿
W + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F) ￿ R
￿
￿ G(R
￿) ￿ G.
It increases with W; the premium the agent receives if the dictator survives, F; the level of
punishment if the agent is caught, and decreases with ￿;R;q. Indeed, both a higher reward
for remaining loyal and a higher punishment for the opposite increase the agent￿ s incentives
to be loyal. A similar intuition applies to R, the ￿xed part of the reward for betrayal. An
increase in q leads to an increase of the probability that the enemy is strong, as perceived by
10the agent. This, in turn, decreases agent￿ s fear to be punished, and makes him more likely to
betray. Finally, a smarter agent receives a strong signal less frequently than a less competent
one does, but once he has received a strong signal, he is more sure that the enemy is really
strong, which also decreases his fear of punishment.
The above formula, though straightforward mathematically, deserves additional discus-
sion. A more competent advisor (the one with a high ￿) can betray the principal for a
higher level of utility he secures if the dictator survives, since he can a⁄ord gambling on
a lower level of reward by the enemy. In other words, the dictator has to pay a smarter
agent a higher wage if he wants him to be as loyal as a less competent one. Therefore, if the
dictator is free to choose the level of agent￿ s compensation as it is standard in the corporate
governance literature, he is able to mitigate the loyalty-vs.-competence trade-o⁄. However,
the dictator has a very limited power on determining the payo⁄s for the agent, both for the
case where the agent is to be rewarded and when he is to be punished. From the ex ante
perspective, the reward is not what the dictator promises, but what the agent believes about
the dictator￿ s promises. A track record of promises being kept is a thing worth having for a
dictator, but once his power is challenged, he drowns into a spiral where his fear of viziers￿
disloyalty makes them feeling more unsafe and, therefore, less loyal.
2.3 Dictator￿ s Choice
Once we know what each agent does in any state of the world, we can proceed with the
dictator￿ s problem. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, the dictator assigns ￿D (Weak) = L,
￿D (Strong) = H. Indeed, there is no reason to order the agent to take extra measures if
the enemy is weak, because the agent will necessarily obey the order. On the other hand,
if the signal is strong, it is better if the agent exerts high e⁄orts, with the exception of the
case of an agent who is so incompetent that spares too much resources against a weak enemy
wrongly perceived as strong. Since the dictator can hire an agent of his choice, this never
happens in equilibrium.
The dictator￿ s utility equals
UD(￿) = (1 ￿ q)Y + (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)G. (2)
11The ￿rst-order condition for the dictator￿ s problem of choosing the best agent is as follows:
@UD (￿)
@￿
= (1 ￿ q)CG ￿ (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
0 = 0: (3)
This formula highlights the trade-o⁄ the dictator faces. He wants to balance the bene￿t
of competence (associated with less money spent on defense if it is unnecessary) and its cost
(because of possibility of betrayal):
(1 ￿ q)CG = (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
0:
The left-hand side is the marginal bene￿t of hiring a more competent agent. A marginal
increase in ￿ saves the amount of C with probability (1 ￿ q)G times this marginal increase,
i.e. if the enemy is weak but the agent receives a strong signal and chooses not to betray. The
right part is the expected loss because of betrayal, taking into account potential economy of
resources if the agent betrays. In the Appendix, we show that the dictator￿ s utility function
UD (￿) under standard policy prescription is single-peaked. Moreover, if ￿
￿ 2 [0;1] is its
global maximum, then it is strictly concave on [￿
￿;1]. The following Proposition summarizes
the above discussion.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in the game, character-
ized by ￿
￿ and R￿. In the equilibrium, ￿D (S) = H and ￿D (W) = L, the dictator hires an
agent of type ￿
￿, and the agent betrays if and only if s = H and R + R > R￿.
Proposition 2 establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium and allows us to study how
the equilibrium choice of the agent￿ s competence,
￿
￿ = arg max
￿2[0;1]
UD (￿);
depends on the parameters of the model. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
maximum is interior.
Proposition 3 The optimal agent is more able ( ￿
￿ = argmaxUD is high) when either
(i) the dictator is strong (q is low);
(ii) the stakes are low for the dictator (Y is low);
12(iii) the a¢ nity between the vizier and the enemy is weak (R is low);
(iv) the measures that have to be taken are more costly (C is high).
Proposition 3 asserts that a less able agent is more likely to be chosen when either the
dictator is weak, or he faces greater threat, or he values his power more (plans to leave a
successor), or the enemy values the power more (when stakes are high), or can commit to
rewards. (The parameter R is interpreted as a degree to which the plotter can commit to
rewarding the agent if the plot is successful.) One can expect that general problems with
commitment in a weakly-institutionalized environment mean, on average, less rewards, and
this induces the advisor to remain loyal to the dictator. On the other hand, these problems
might prevent enemies from overthrowing the dictator, since they are too unable to make
credible promises. When are the plotters able to commit to reward the traitor? One such
situation might be that the agent has his own political base, be it a certain ethnic or military
faction. Thus, a dictator who thinks of bringing a local warlord to the central government,
might be interested in increasing the vizier￿ s loyalty parameter, e.g. by taking a family
member as hostage as it was practiced in the 13th-century Horezm.
One occurrence where the above analysis is especially relevant is international nego-
tiations. Modern dictators rarely negotiate on their own, and the choice of a negotiator
involves the trade-o⁄ we explore: the dictator has to choose a negotiator who is competent
enough to bring agreement on favorable terms, yet too much competence might make the
negotiator more sensitive to personal alternatives provided by the other side. The political
science literature on negotiations and informative signalling has been growing intensively
in the recent time. Kydd (2002) argues that a biased mediator might be more e⁄ective in
conveying message to a party in negotiations. His argument relies on the consideration that
only a mediator biased towards the recipient of the signal can deliver credible threats, for
he would not forge the threat if there were none. Dictators, however, often treat suggestions
to negotiate as a treason, and this may be fatal for subordinates who o⁄er to negotiate.10
With loyal mediocrities being dictator￿ s only trusted negotiators, it is not surprising that
negotiations with dictators often lead to nowhere (literally, these envoys are often unable
10Since Kydd (2002) considers a mediator as an exogenously given third party, this problem does not arise
in his work.
13to see advantages and disadvantages of certain proposals). Saddam Hussein, Hitler, even
Napoleon, the smartest of all dictators, have allowed their capitals to be occupied (and in
the extreme case of Hitler, almost fully destroyed) by the enemy forces, refusing for months
to have serious negotiations.
3 Commitment to Punishment and Adverse Selection
Political scientists (e.g., Lewis, 1978) have been long aware that the dictatorial rule averts
able people from joining high-level politics. In his memoirs, Albert Speer, once a second-
ranked o¢ cial in the Third Reich and a Hitler con￿dant, uses the words ￿ negative selection￿
about the Hitler￿ s court, discussing at length ignorance and incompetence of Hitler￿ s closest
subordinates (Speer, 1970).11 This is a particular case of the Akerlof adverse selection prob-
lem: the more severely the dictator punishes (if survives the betrayal) those who betrayed
him, the less the ability of agents applying for the job. Hence, the dictator faces a trade-o⁄
between high incentives for agents already on the job provided by a harsh punishment for
betrayal, and low incentives to apply for the job. Indeed, the harsher the punishment for
betrayal is, the lower is the expected utility of a competent advisor. Since it is the agent￿ s
competence that allows him to discriminate among potential plotters, he would never need
to use his competence when the price of betrayal is in￿nite disutility.
Thus, a dictator has incentives to commit to the optimal punishment which is less than
capital. However, the very nature of dictatorships precludes such commitment.12 Here
democracies might have an advantage, since in democracies it is easier to commit to a
mild punishment. In a democracy, though a punishment for a political betrayal might be
politically severe, it rarely brings signi￿cant personal harm. Clearly, a U.S. President is
bound by laws not to kill a cabinet member who pursues his own presidential ambitions as
Secretary Chase was doing in the Lincoln￿ s ￿rst cabinet (e.g., Dudley, 1932), or Attorney
General Robert Kennedy in the ￿rst cabinet of President Johnson.13 Betraying a brutal
11Apparently, Speer does consider himself a counterexample that only proves the rule.
12Since a dictator is not constrained by any external authority, we are concerned with (the absence of)
motivationally, as opposed to imperatively, credible commitments (Shepsle, 1991).
13In a small note, Edwards (2001) points to the same loyalty-vs.-competence trade-o⁄ in recent low-level
14dictator such as Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro might have been more costly for their
ministers.14 Here we suggest a formal description of this phenomenon.
Proposition 4 (i) Assume R￿g (R￿) is a decreasing function of R￿. There exists a level of
punishment F0 such that for all F ￿ F0; the optimal advisor becomes more competent (￿
￿(F)
is increasing) with F. However, ￿
￿(F) < 1 for any F ￿ F0:
(ii) Let ￿ < 1 be the most competent type of advisor available, such that the dictator
is still better o⁄ if he sets standard policy prescription. For any u > 0; there exists some
F0 = F0(u) such that for all F > F0 and all ￿ 2
￿
0;￿
￿
; the agent￿ s utility does not exceed
juA (￿;F)j < u and
￿ ￿ ￿
@uA(￿;F)
@￿
￿ ￿ ￿ < u.
(iii) If reservation utility of an agent of type ￿; H(￿); is a continuously di⁄erentiable func-
tion of ￿ and H0(￿) > 0, then for a su¢ ciently high punishment only relatively incompetent
advisors will be self-selected.
The ￿rst part of the above proposition shows that a higher level of punishment makes
a more competent advisor desirable for the dictator. The second and the third parts assert
that with a higher level of punishment, high-skilled agents gain less from their ability to
discriminate potential plotters. Thus, when able agents face higher opportunity costs than
agents with low ability, they have fewer incentives to apply for the job when the punishment
is high. Part (iii) is proved given the least restrictive assumption regarding outside oppor-
tunities of skilled agents. We assume that a more skilled agent has better outside prospects
than a less able one, but the di⁄erence (the slope) might be really small.
presidential appointment in the U.S.
14In January 1984, the honorary title of ￿ Hero of the Cuban Republic￿was conferred upon Gen. Arnaldo
Ochoa in recognition of his extraordinary contributions to the insurrection against Batista, to the consolida-
tion of the nation￿ s defense, and for his service in international missions. In June 1989, MINFAR Minister
Raul Castro explained that Gen. Ochoa ￿ was no longer the rebel soldier, the invader of Camilo￿ s column,
the internationalist in Venezuela, the commander of our troops in Ethiopia.￿In July 1989, the prosecutor￿ s
closing remarks stated that ￿it became evident that we were confronted with a crime of treason committed
against the fatherland, against the people, against his superiors, and against the very idea of what a revo-
lutionary, a military chief, and a Cuban internationalist ￿ghter really is. In accordance with the ￿ sentence
dictated by the Special Military Court, Case No. 1 of 1989￿Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa and three others had faced
a ￿ring squad in July 1989. (Alfonso, 1989 and sources cited therein.)
15The key point in our analysis is that both a democratic leader and a violent dictator have a
limited ability to change F, though the reasons are profoundly di⁄erent. A democratic leader
is bound by laws, and he may even not be the one who determines the size of punishment.
It is of course only natural to expect the level of punishment to be greater in the case of a
dictatorial rule. Consequently, in a democracy, leaders are more prone to political treason,
but the pool of applicants to the agent￿ s position is likely to be better. Conversely, the
bloodiest dictator may feel himself relatively safe from betrayal, but the agents he will have
to choose from will be extremely incompetent.
One potential counter argument is that the dictator could enter the private labor market
and selectively depress rewards for competence, say, by threatening the family members of
potential agents if the agent refuses to enter his service. While this argument certainly
does have merit when applied to a single agent, this approach seems impossible on a large
scale. Mass emigration is a most clear indication of unfavorable circumstances for talented
people. In the ￿rst ￿ve years of the Mussolini regime, one and half million people left Italy
(Cannistraro and Rosoli, 1979). For the political and intellectual elite, which is a tiny fraction
of any country￿ s population, its exile might not be easily detected by crude statistical data.
For example, the departure of Albert Einstein, Joseph Schumpeter, Thomas Mann, and John
von Neumann preceded mass emigration of intellectual elite from Europe, but might have
still made profound impact on intellectual, and by implication, political life in their home
countries. Thus, even for individual geniuses, providing the incentives to work in a certain
political environment, might be a complicated task for the dictator. In much less frightening
circumstances of the last decades of the Soviet rule, but without a possibility to emigrate,
talented young Russians chose mathematics and natural science, generally avoiding politics
(and, e.g., political science) as an occupation. One result, besides ￿ ourishing science, was
that political positions were occupied by profound mediocrities.
4 Succession
Once an absence of ordered continuance was considered a major drawback of dictatorship as
a form of government (Herz, 1952, Spearman, 1939, Olson, 1993). However, in the ￿rst half
16of the 20th century a number of once-dictatorial regimes survived the death of their founding
fathers (e.g., Lenin in Russia, and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey). Nowadays, the technology of
succession appears to be advanced enough to produce successful transition in such diverse
countries as Syria in 2000, North Korea in 1994, China in 1989 and Kongo in 2003. Our
model predicts that a ruler with a longer time horizon, e.g., resulting from the assurance
of a desired succession, has more incentives to hire the most able agents. The last years
of kings of the largest European monarchies, England, France, and Russia, executed by the
revolutionaries might give additional support to this result. All these monarchs at the time
they lost the crown had very young heirs, incapable of grasping the power if their fathers
were dead. And the last years of each of these rulers were marred by colossal incompetence
of their prime ministers.
To introduce a dynamic perspective, we make the following extension to our basic setup.15
Now we assume that each dictator is succeeded by another ruler, and that ruler￿ s utility may
also be an object of dictator￿ s concern. Speci￿cally, the successor may be either desirable
for the dictator or not. In the ￿rst case, the successor￿ s utility is added to that of the
dictator with a discount factor ￿ < 1. In the latter case, the dictator does not care about his
successor￿ s utility at all. We may interpret ￿ as a measure of a¢ nity between the dictator
and his successor. It is natural to think that ￿ is high in the case of monarchy, but low in
the case of army colonels succeeding one another.
Each dictator is characterized by his ability to ensure succession to the desirable heir in
the case he does not survive the plot. The succession is either secure (S) or insecure (I). In
the ￿rst case, the heir is desirable, and the hier￿ s type is now either S with probability PS;
or I with probability PI, so PS + PI = 1. In the latter case, the heir is desirable and secure
himself (has type S) with probability QS; and desirable and insecure (heir￿ s type is I) with
probability QI. However, QS + QI < 1, so there is a non-trivial chance that the successor
will not be desired. His type in this case is irrelevant from the dictator￿ s standpoint. If the
dictator wins, he is able to ensure that the successor is desired and has type S. One may
rationalize this case as the one where the dictator succeeds himself.
15Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) introduced a broad class of dynamic models for comparative political
economy. (See also Acemoglu, 2003, and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2004.)
17For each dictator, the probability that the dictator loses equals q (1 ￿ G), where G is the
probability that the agent obeys even having received a strong signal. Denote
Y
￿ = (1 ￿ q)Y + (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)G:
The agent is concerned with his one-period utility (for the sake of simplicity, he serves the
dictator for one period only). The dictator faces the following utility maximization problems.
US = max
￿
(Y
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ q (1 ￿ G))US + ￿q (1 ￿ G)(PSUS + PIUI)):
UI = max
￿
(Y
￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ q (1 ￿ G))US + ￿q (1 ￿ G)(QSUS + QIUI)):
We search for perfect Markov equilibria in this game.
Proposition 5 (i) There exists a unique perfect Markov equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
US > UI, and the competence of the agent is less in the state I than in the state S.
(ii) For smaller ￿, US, UI and US ￿UI are smaller. Consequently, the competence of the
agent is higher if the dictator cares less about his successors.
Part (i) shows that a less sure succession leads to less competent agents. This result may
be used to explain poor governance of monarchs whose immediate heirs are small children, or
have other contenders for the throne (i.e., relatives they do not like). Part (ii) demonstrates
that less desired succession leads to better agents. It may also help to explain the di⁄erence
between ￿ party-machine￿dictatorships such as Mexico in 1940-90, where members of a non-
representative selectorate succeed each other as leaders of the country, but have neither
desire nor possibility to pass this post to their children, and monarchies, where rulers would
like to do it. The model predicts that a personalist dictatorship is less likely to witness
competent advisors than an institutionalized dictatorship. Dom￿nguez (2002) rea¢ rms that
￿ the most successful authoritarian regimes, namely, historical bureaucratic empires, had
means of succession from one monarch to the next and featured bureaucratic organizations for
the sharing and exercise of power.￿Not coincidentally, Mexico, probably the most successful
of 20th century dictatorships, had a well-institutionalized procedure for succession for almost
six decades.
185 Courtiers
Appointing a council instead of a single advisor, the dictator might enjoy two kinds of bene-
￿ts. First, with a council, more information can be aggregated, especially if members￿signals
are uncorrelated. Second, the members of the council face the coordination problem with
respect to treason, and dictators usually took advantage of it. While the latter advantage
has been already well understood by Machiavelli, the former is much less so. We allow for
the possibility of a second agent in the model to investigate when the dictator is better suited
to enjoy the information-aggregation advantages of a court.
Assume that the dictator has to hire two agents of type ￿.16 We consider the following
modi￿cation of our basic setup. Suppose that each agent gets the same (correct!) information
about potential reward R + R, but the signals s1 and s2 are independent conditional on t.
(This implies that information can indeed be aggregated.) Both agents can exert either high
or low e⁄orts; they choose their actions simultaneously and independently. As before, the
dictator is safe if the enemy is weak. If the enemy is strong, the dictator is absolutely secure
if both agents have chosen high defense, and absolutely insecure if none has. If only one
agent has exerted high e⁄orts and the enemy is strong, the enemy wins with probability
￿. Each half of defense costs C
2. As for the agents￿payo⁄, they are rewarded or punished
independently, i.e. participation of another agent in a coup does not undermine the potential
bene￿ts of any agent. Finally, assume for simplicity that policy prescription is ￿xed at
￿D (Strong) = H, ￿D (Weak) = L for both agents.17
As before, we proceed with backward induction. It is easy to establish that if agent i
receives signal si = Weak, then he obeys the dictator (and chooses low defense level). The
intuition is practically the same: the agent knows that whatever his colleague does, the
dictator will survive, and this makes him willing to avoid punishment.
Now consider the case where si = S. Having received such signal, the agent cares whether
16Alternatively, we could consider the case where agents may have distinct types ￿1 and ￿2. However, this
would at some point lead to unnecessary complications that would shade the coordination e⁄ect we want to
depict.
17In particular, this is done to avoid the potential situation where one half of defense is almost su¢ cient
to protect the dictator, so he tells one agent to choose low defense all the time in order to save resources.
19the enemy is strong. Bayes formula yields
P(t = S j si = S) =
q
q + (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ q)
.
If the enemy is strong, he knows that his colleague has also received s￿i = S, i.e.
P(s￿i = S j t = S; si = S) = 1.
If, however, the enemy is weak, agent i does not care about his colleague￿ s signal, because
he knows that in that case he would be punished anyway if he attempts to betray.
To summarize, agent i knows that if the enemy is strong, his fellow agent also receives
signal s￿i = S. Moreover, he knows what information about R his colleague received, since
they both receive correct information. We want to ￿nd out agent i￿ s best reaction to his
colleague￿ s strategy. Denote by di (R) the level of defense that agent i chooses if his signal
is strong and the potential reward equals R. Function di is assumed to be measurable, and
its value set is fH;Lg. We aim at searching what di￿ s will be the case at equilibria.
Suppose that agent i has received a strong signal and that the potential reward equals
R. If d￿i (R) = L, i.e. another agent will betray if his signal is also strong, then the agent
will betray if and only if
￿
R + R
￿ q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿ F
￿
1 ￿
q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿
> W
￿
1 ￿
￿q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿
,
which is equivalent to
R > (W + F)
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
￿
￿ F ￿ R ￿ ￿W ￿ RL.
Similarly, if d￿i (R) = H, i.e. another agent will not betray for such R, the agent will betray
if and only if
￿
R + R
￿ ￿q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿ F
￿
1 ￿
￿q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿
> W,
which is equivalent to
R >
1
￿
(W + F)
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
￿
￿ F ￿ R ￿ RH.
This result is quite intuitive. The agent has stronger incentives to betray if the potential
reward is high. Note that RL < RH, which simply means that the threshold reward is lower
if another agent chooses to betray.
20Now we can summarize these results and ￿nd agent i￿ s best reaction on another agent￿ s
strategy which is given by d￿i. We obtain
BRi (d￿i)(R) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
H, R ￿ RL;
d￿i, RL < R ￿ RH;
L, RH < R.
Having this result, we can prove the following proposition about pure strategy equilibria in
the subgame played by agents. The di⁄erence between these equilibria is in the set of R￿ s
between RL and RH where agents betray. All equilibria are symmetric.
Proposition 6 There exist an in￿nite number of equilibria. In any of them, agents who
received a weak signal obey the dictator. If agent i receives a strong signal, his behavior is
given by function di, such that di (R) = H if R ￿ RL, di (R) = L if RH < R, and for R￿ s
such that RL < R ￿ RH, d1 (R) = d2 (R).
To proceed further, we use equilibria re￿nement to study equilibria that appear to be the
most reasonable ones only. Namely, we con￿ne ourselves to monotonic equilibria, i.e. those
where there exists some ~ R 2 [RL;RH] such that di (R) = H () R ￿ ~ R. Our rationale is
that in the one-agent setup, the agent was more likely to betray for larger R￿ s. We consider
it reasonable to retain this property in the two-agent case. In that case, ~ R parametrizes all
such equilibria.
It is easy to see that both agents are better o⁄ if they play an equilibrium given by a
smaller ~ R. However, it is not always possible for people to negotiate on the equilibrium
they will play.18 Let ￿ be such that ~ R = ￿RL + (1 ￿ ￿)RH. We believe that ￿ re￿ ects trust
between the agents. The dictator￿ s utility if agents play equilibrium characterized by ~ R is
given by the following formula:
U
~ R
D(￿) = (1 ￿ q)Y + (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)G
￿
~ R
￿
.
This helps us establish the following proposition.
18Myerson argues that equilibria people play depend on their cultural di⁄erences.
21Proposition 7 (i) Suppose that the dictator has to hire two agents of a ￿xed type ￿. He
would prefer to hire those whose degree of trust ￿ is as small as possible.
(ii) For every ￿, there exists a unique equilibrium in the game, characterized by ￿
￿,
dictator￿ s optimal choice. Let ￿
￿ be the dictator￿ s choice in the one-agent setup. Then, if
￿ = 1, ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿, i.e. the concordance between agents leads to less competent advisors as
compared to the case of one agent. Moreover, ￿
￿ is decreasing as a function of ￿, provided
that ￿ is close to 1.
This fact may be interpreted as one of implementations of the ￿ Divide-and-Rule￿policy.
Actually, what the dictator wants is lack of trust between his subordinates, which would
prevent coordinated betrayal. The dictator may be better o⁄ if he has an advisor who is
unlikely to cooperate with other ones. For instance, Saddam Hussein might have kept Tarik
Aziz, a Christian, in a predominantly Sunni government for this very reason: he would not
betray Saddam because other Saddam￿ s associates would gladly get rid of him should they
notice any signal of disloyalty. Aziz was even his representative abroad. The logic might
be as follows: should Aziz betray Saddam Hussein, his family in Iraq may su⁄er greatly.
Conversely, if a member of a powerful clan betrayed Saddam, the clan may protect the
family, and this makes betrayal more likely. This may also explain why Saddam executed
his son-in-law (and why the latter had betrayed Saddam, if he really had). Another example
of keeping an advisor who is opposed by the rest of the dictator￿ s associates is Mazarin,
whose Italian origin prevented him from cooperating with French nobles in the time of the
Fronda.
In part (ii) of Proposition 7 we focus on equilibria of the whole game, namely, on the
dictator￿ s choice of ￿. The fact that agents with di⁄erent ￿ may play di⁄erent equilibria
in the subgame makes this problem too complex. To proceed, we assume that agents are
committed to a certain level of trust ￿, and the dictator chooses ￿ taking this level of trust as
given. In other words, apparently good relations between the agents may force the dictator
to hire less competent advisors. Also, if the dictator is able to hire advisors that can hardly
deal with each other, he can a⁄ord more competent ones. We stress that our emphasis is
not on the coordination problem per se. The observation that the success of a plot against a
dictator is conditional upon courtiers￿ability to coordinate on treason is well-established in
22political science literature (e.g., see Kydd, 2004, for a formal treatment). We show that the
trust between advisors prevents the dictator from enjoying fruits of information aggregation,
which is the single most important reason to have a council at all. This proposition may
also help to explain the observation that many dictators often get rid of early supporters.
We believe that it may be the case because early supporters had a long history of working
with each other, and if they assisted the dictator in coming to power, they might even have a
history of struggle for a common cause. This might have increased the level of trust between
them, thus making them dangerous to the dictator. In particular, it makes sense for the
dictator to replace people with new ones from time to time.
6 Conclusion
In a recent inquiry into dynamic nature of most dictatorship, Acemoglu, Robinson, and
Verdier (2004) suggest that ￿ while the academic study of strongly-institutionalized polities
is well advanced, there are few studies, and less of a consensus, on the nature of weakly-
institutionalized polities.￿ The poor governance in mature dictatorships, as well as their
degeneration, allow for a number of plausible explanations. These include greediness and
sel￿shness of the dictator, as well as his personal incompetence and inability to listen and fol-
low advice. We use the formal apparatus of economic theory to investigate agency problems
in dictatorships as compared to democracies. We demonstrate that it is the unwillingness
and inability of the dictator, fearing of opportunistic behavior of the agent and in the worst
case his or her betrayal, to surround himself with competent associates that causes poor
performance of dictatorships in the long run. The resulting incompetence will sooner or
later have an adverse e⁄ect on the policies carried out and consequently on economic per-
formance and social welfare.19 Indeed, the de￿nition of competence we use is, in a sense,
19Of course, economic performance of dictatorships is a recurring discourse for emipirical research. While
acknowledging that the emerging consensus in recent empirical studies does emphasize advantages of democ-
racy, Glaeser et al (2004) argue that dictorial rule might be conductive for economic growth. However,
the point of reference seems to be elusive: in the underdeveloped world, which provides most of examples
of rapid growth under dictatorship, democracy is often not a plausible option at all. Our theory does not
necessarily imply that a dictatorship, if an inferior form of government, will necessarily vanish.
23all-encompassing: a more competent person just has a more re￿ned picture of the world.
Our model allows to get insights in a number of situations, ranging from the one where
the dictator who survived the plot is still uncertain whether or not he was betrayed, to the
situation, when the dictator chooses to appoint a council instead of an advisor. However, we
do not model explicitly the situation where the agent betrayed, the plot turned nevertheless
unsuccessful, but the dictator does not automatically learn that his agent is a traitor. In
real-life situations, he may very well be uncertain whether or not the agent￿ s inaction prior
to the plot was betrayal or just lack of competence. Contrary to predictions of our analysis,
there is a strand in the literature on dictatorships that argues that the dictators have an
advantage in choosing most able man for government positions, while in democracies the
￿rst-best choice may be impossible. Though there is a certain merit to this point, the
circumstances in which a dictator has this advantage are limited. One such situation appear
when a new dictator emerge after years of political stagnation or political turmoil, bringing
a whole class of politically young and able people with him. However, though emergence of
new faces in politics or government may coincide with an accession of a dictator, it might
be the same political wave that removed the former elite that made both a new dictator and
extended opportunities of other talented individuals possible. Famous Napoleon￿ s marshals,
a group of brilliant military o¢ cers with plebeian origin who pursued their army careers to
the point previously reserved to people of noble origin only, might be an example. Though
their military glory came in full under the Napoleon￿ s command in early 1800s, it was the
French revolution of the earlier decade that made a dramatic break in their careers possible.
And of course even mature and powerful dictators are constrained by political considerations,
and their need of political alliances might actually be higher than that of democratic leaders.
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27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) If s = Weak, then t = Weak, and the agent knows that the
dictator will survive for sure. The dictator will also survive if s = Strong, but ￿D (S) = L
and the agent betrays. Therefore, in these cases the agent will obey in order to avoid
punishment. If, however, s = Weak, but ￿D (S) = H, then the agent has the following
options. If he obeys and builds high defense, he will get W for sure. If he betrays, he gets
R + R if t = Strong and ￿F if t = Weak. Therefore, he betrays if and only if
￿
R + R
￿ q
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
￿ F
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
> W:
(ii) This probability equals
P
￿
R ￿ W + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F) ￿ R
￿
= G
￿
W + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F) ￿ R
￿
:
The last expression increases with W;F and decreases with ￿;q;R. To keep this probability
the same if ￿ increases, the dictator needs larger W or F. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we consider the dictator￿ s choice. If s = W, then the agent
will obey, and it is best for the dictator to choose ￿D (W) = L. If ￿D (W) = ￿D (S) = L,
then the dictator￿ s expected utility equals (1 ￿ q)Y , since no defense will be ever built.
However, the dictator will be better o⁄ if he chooses ￿D (W) = L, ￿D (S) = H and ￿ = 1,
because in that case defense will be built with a non-zero probability and only if t = S. This
completes the ￿rst part of the proof.
Now let us prove that there are no interior minima. For brevity, denote X ￿ q (Y ￿ C)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C. Di⁄erentiate (3) with respect to ￿:
@2UD (￿)
@￿
2 = ￿2(1 ￿ q)C
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
0 + X
￿
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)
￿2
G
00. (4)
From (3) we conclude that if
@UD(￿)
@￿ ￿ 0, which is of course true at a local interior minimum,
then X > 0, and thus (4) implies
@2UD(￿)
@￿2 < 0, since G00 < 0. Evidently, this violates the
necessary second-order condition. Therefore, this function has exactly one local maximum,
i.e. it is single-peaked. Also note that if ￿
￿ is a local maximum of UD (￿) which does not
equal to 1, then
@UD(￿)
@￿ ￿ 0, and X > 0 at ￿
￿ as well as at all points to the right of ￿
￿, since
28X increases with ￿
￿. Therefore,
@2UD(￿)
@￿2 < 0 on [￿
￿;1]. Therefore, ￿D is determined uniquely,
and ￿
￿ is also unique. This completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Propositon 3. We are of course interested only in the case of an interior max-
imum, in the sense that
@UD(￿)
@￿ = 0 at this point. Di⁄erentiating the implicit function
￿
￿ = ￿
￿ (x), where x is any of the parameters, we ￿nd that it the dependence is positive if
and only if the cross-derivative of UD (￿) by ￿ and x is positive at ￿
￿. Now compute the
cross-derivatives (since we need to do it only at points where
@UD(￿)
@￿ = 0, we may assume
X > 0).
@2UD (￿)
@￿@q
= ￿
@UD(￿)
@￿
1 ￿ q
￿
1 ￿ q
q2
￿
2C (1 ￿ ￿)(W + F)G
0 + X
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
00
￿
@2UD (￿)
@￿@q
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @UD(￿)
@￿ =0
= ￿
1 ￿ q
q2 (W + F)
￿
2C (1 ￿ ￿)G
0 + X
1 ￿ q
q
G
00
￿
< 0
@2UD (￿)
@￿@Y
= ￿(1 ￿ q)(W + F)G
0 < 0
@2UD (￿)
@￿@R
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿=￿￿
= ￿(1 ￿ q)CG
0 ￿ X
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
00 < 0
@2UD (￿)
@￿@C
= (1 ￿ q)G + (q + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q))
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)G
0 > 0.
This completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Compute the following cross-derivative.
@2UD (￿)
@￿@F
= ((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)C ￿ X)
1 ￿ q
q
G
0 ￿ X
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ q
q
G
00.
If (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)C ￿X ￿ 0, then
@2UD(￿)
@￿@F is positive for obvious reasons. Otherwise, observe
that since R￿G0 (R￿) is decreasing by R￿, then R￿G00 + G0 < 0, and we can substitute G0 to
get
@2UD (￿)
@￿@F
>
￿
￿((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)C ￿ X)
￿
W ￿ R
￿
￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 C
1 ￿ q
q
(W + F)
￿
1 ￿ q
q
G
00:
The expression in brackets is negative for large F because it is linear with respect to F.
Therefore,
@2UD(￿)
@￿@F > 0 for large F. At the same time,
29@UD (￿)
@￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿=1
= (1 ￿ q)CG
￿
W ￿ R
￿
￿ (Y ￿ C)(1 ￿ q)(W + F)G
0 ￿
W ￿ R
￿
.
This expression is linear by F and is decreasing. Therefore, it is negative for su¢ ciently
large F.
Now consider the agent￿ s utility. In the equilibrium, agent￿ s utility function is given by
UA (￿) = q
0
@WG +
1 Z
R￿
RG
0dR
1
A + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)(WG ￿ F (1 ￿ G)) + ￿(1 ￿ q)W.
Its derivative with respect to ￿ equals
@UA (￿)
@￿
= (1 ￿ q)(W + F)(1 ￿ G).
It is easy to see that on
￿
0;￿
￿
both UA (￿) and
@UA(￿)
@￿ uniformly tend to zero as F ! 1.
Since
@H(￿)
@￿ is continuous, it is uniformly separated from 0, and hence
@UA(￿)
@￿ <
@H(￿)
@￿ for
large F. Therefore, the set of agents for whom UA (￿) ￿ H (￿) is a non-empty (because it
contains 0) segment [0;￿0]. In other words, for large F only relatively incompetent agents
are selected. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Basically, the equations (??) and (??) can be rewritten as
US = max
￿
f (US;UI);
UI = max
￿
g (US;UI):
The right-hand side de￿nes a mapping from the plane (US;UI) to itself. Let us establish
that this mapping is contracting in metric C1, i.e. where the distance is the maximum
of distances between corresponding coordinates. Let ￿ =
1+￿
2 . We show that the distance
between images does not exceed ￿ times the distance between arguments. First, let us show
that if one argument is ￿xed at (U0
S;U0
I), then this holds if the other argument (US;UI) is in
some small vicinity of (U0
S;U0
I). Evidently, by using Lagrange￿ s formula ￿max￿ f (US;UI) =
@f
@US (￿)￿US +
@f
@UI (￿)￿UI. Note that partial derivatives are calculated at some points, both
coordinates of which are between those of (U0
S;U0
I) and (US;UI). Therefore, by contracting
30the vicinity, we can make the partial derivatives at these points as close as possible to those
at (U0
S;U0
I). To compute the latter, we do not need to di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿ by the
envelope￿ s theorem. Therefore,
@f
@US
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(U0
S;U0
I)
= ￿ ((1 ￿ q (1 ￿ G)) + q (1 ￿ G)PS)
and
@f
@UI
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
(U0
S;U0
I)
= ￿q (1 ￿ G)PI:
Therefore, in some vicinity of
￿
U0
P;U0
Q
￿
we have
￿max
￿
f (US;UI) < K max(￿US;￿UI) ￿ ￿ max(￿US;￿UI);
where K = ￿ ((1 ￿ q (1 ￿ G)) + q (1 ￿ G)PS) + ￿q (1 ￿ G)PI +
1￿￿
2 , and the term
1￿￿
2 is
chosen to majorate any inaccuracies in computation of partial derivatives that come from
substituting an arbitrary point in the vicinity to point (U0
S;U0
I). Similar reasoning yields
￿max￿ g (US;UI) < ￿ max(￿US;￿UI). Therefore, the same holds for the maximum of the
increments.
Now consider two arbitrary points on the plane and connect them with a segment. Each
point on the segment yields a vicinity with the property de￿ned (it contracts to its center).
Taking a ￿nite subset of these vicinities that covers the segment, we can add the inequalities
obtained to get that ￿max￿ g (US;UI) < ￿ max(￿US;￿UI) holds for any points. This proves
that the mapping is contracting, and the equations have a unique solution (US;UI).
To prove that at this solution, both US and UI are positive, note that any iteration process
converges to (US;UI). If we take some point with positive coordinates, we observe that its
image preserves that property. Therefore US and UI are at least non-negative. But none of
them can be zero because neither max￿ f (US;UI) nor max￿ g (US;UI) may equal zero if US
and UI are nonnegative. Furthermore, the double inequality US ￿ UI ￿ 0 is also preserved,
because if g reaches its maximum at ￿0, then the value of f at ￿0 not less than that of g,
and the maximum value of f can be even greater. US = UI may not be the case, hence,
US > UI. The coe¢ cients at G are for the two states are X + ￿q (1 ￿ PS)(US ￿ UI) and
X + ￿q ((1 ￿ QS)(US ￿ UI) + (1 ￿ QS ￿ QI)UI), respectively, and the latter is obviously
greater. Therefore, ￿ is not less in the state S than in the state I.
31(ii) Suppose that for ￿0, (U0
S;U0
I), where U0
S > U0
I, is the stable point. We need to study
the signs of the derivatives
dUS
@￿ ,
dUI
@￿ and
dUS￿dUI
@￿ at point ￿0. Just as before, we do not need
to di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿. Therefore, the signs are the same as in the case of mapping
U
1
S = f (US;UI);
U
1
I = g (US;UI);
where ￿ is ￿xed. This mapping is linear. Obviously, if U0
S ￿ US ￿ UI ￿ 0, then U0
S ￿ U1
S ￿
U1
I ￿ 0. Suppose that ￿ < ￿0. To prove that this implication is still the case, we notice
that,
U
1
S ￿ U
1
I = ￿q (1 ￿ G)((PS ￿ QS)US + (PI ￿ QI)UI)
= ￿q (1 ￿ G)((PS ￿ QS)(US ￿ UI) + (PS ￿ QS + PI ￿ QI)UI):
Since PS ￿QS +PI ￿QI > 0, the middle inequality is also preserved, and for the other two
the statement is evident. Therefore, for ￿, the stable point lies in the area where US < U0
S
and US ￿ UI < U0
S ￿ U0
I (it is easy to see that ￿ has a non-trivial e⁄ect on these values
and inequalities are strict). Also, the inequality U0
I > UI is preserved, and thus the second
coordinate of the stable point also decreases. This leads to a higher competence of agents if
￿ is smaller (in both cases), since coe¢ cients at G become less in both states. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. Obviously, if s = W, then t = W, and thus the agent will
obey. Consider the case where agent i received si = S. From the best response formula it
is easy to see that if R ￿ RL, then obeying the dictator is best for the agent regardless of
his counterpart￿ s strategy. Similarly, if R > RH, it is optimal for him to betray the dictator.
For intermediate values of R, i.e. if RL < R ￿ RH, it is optimal to behave exactly the same
way as the other agent does. Evidently, any functions d1 and d2 satisfying these properties
constitute a Nash equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) The dictator￿ s utility equals
U
~ R
D(￿) = (1 ￿ q)Y + (q (Y ￿ C) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)C)G
￿
~ R
￿
;
which is increasing with ~ R; which is in turn decreasing with ￿. Consequently, for any ￿xed
￿ the dictator will choose a pair of agents with as little ￿ as possible.￿
32(ii) As in the proof of proposition 2, we can di⁄erentiate U
~ R
D(￿), where ~ R is a function
of both ￿ and ￿, twice to see that it is single-peaked. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique.
Notice that for ￿ = 1, U
~ R
D(￿) becomes single-agent UD(￿) if we set ￿ = 0 instead of some
positive value. Therefore, since
@2U
~ R
D (￿)
@￿@￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=1
< 0;
the advisors chosen by the dictator are worse if the trust between them is perfect than in
the case of a single agent. Furthermore, for ￿ close to 1; it is easy to see that
@2U
~ R
D (￿)
@￿@￿
< 0.
Consequently, the quality of agents optimal for the dictator deteriorates as trust between
them increases. This observation completes the proof.￿
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